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On Kindleberger and Hegemony:
From Berlin to M.I.T. and Back
Stephen Meardon 1

Version of September 29, 2013

Abstract
The most notable idea of Charles P. Kindleberger’s later career is the value of a single
country acting as stabilizer of an international economy prone to instability. It runs
through his widely read books, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (1973), Manias,
Crises, and Panics (1978), A Financial History of Western Europe (1984), and kindred
works. “Hegemonic stability,” the idea is called in the literature it inspired. This essay
traces Kindleberger’s attachment to the idea back to his tenure as chief of the State
Department’s Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs from 1945 to 1947 and
adviser to the European Recovery Program from 1947 to 1948. In both capacities
Kindleberger observed and participated indirectly in the 1948 monetary reform in
Western Germany. In the 1990s, during his octogenary decade, he revisited the German
monetary reform with a fellow participant, economist, and longtime friend, F. Taylor
Ostrander. Their collaborative essay marked Kindleberger’s effort to reclaim hegemonic
stability theory from the scholars who developed it following his works of the 1970s and
1980s.

JEL codes: B31, N14, F02
Keywords: Kindleberger, Charles P.; Ostrander, F. Taylor; leadership; hegemony;
monetary reform
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“My instinct, or political prejudice, suggests that Nature
abhors a vacuum, including one of power, and that the
United States is assisting the work of Nature in its
worldwide intervention.”

– Charles P. Kindleberger, Power and Money (1970), p. 83.

Introduction
In the large trove of Charles P. Kindleberger’s “historical economics,” comprising The
World in Depression, 1929-1939 (1973, 1986), Manias, Crises, and Panics (1978, 1989,
2000), A Financial History of Western Europe (1984, 1993), and kindred contributions,
the most conspicuous idea is the value of a single country acting as stabilizer of an
international economy prone to instability. 2 “Hegemonic stability,” the idea is called in
the literature it inspired (e.g. Keohane 1986). This essay studies Kindleberger’s
attachment to the idea, which, as the epigraph shows, was more than an idea. It was an
instinct honed by his personal experiences during the Second World War and its
aftermath.
Kindleberger himself wrote occasionally about his wartime and early post-war
experiences, including his tenure as chief of the State Department’s Division of German
and Austrian Economic Affairs from 1945 to 1947 and adviser to the European Recovery
Program from 1947 to 1948 (Kindleberger [1968] 1987; 1987; 1989; 1991; [1997] 1999).
Here and there he gives a glimpse of their importance to the big idea (e.g. Kindleberger
1987, 181-184). One set of experiences of special importance to his subsequent career
was his observations on and indirect participation in the 1948 German monetary reform.
With the reform, the United States impelled Germany’s conversion of old currency and
other paper assets to new currency at a fraction of their former nominal value, to the end
2

For corroborating views of the centrality of the idea in Kindleberger’s oeuvre see Kirshner,
Gourevitch, and Eichengreen (1997) and Temin (1999, ix).
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of dismantling price controls without fomenting price inflation. This, too, Kindleberger
wrote about – fifty years later, at the back end of his octogenary decade, and in

collaboration with a longtime friend and fellow economist whose acquaintance with him
dated back to the early ‘30s. In the collaboration Kindleberger emphasized the relevance
of the German monetary reform to the idea of hegemonic stability and other timely
questions, not to development of the idea through his own life and work. This essay
shifts the emphasis. The primary materials of the collaboration – notes, correspondence,
printed materials, unpublished manuscripts – help to explain, as Kindleberger himself did
not, how he got his “instinct” and what it meant for development of the hegemonic
stability idea.

Early careers of Kindleberger and F. Taylor Ostrander
Kindleberger’s collaborator was Frank Taylor Ostrander, an economist of exactly the
same vintage as he (b. 1910). The two first crossed paths at a Students International
Union conference in New York City in the spring of 1931, Kindleberger representing the
University of Pennsylvania and Ostrander Williams College. Both were in the class of
’32, both would be elected Phi Beta Kappa. From the strength of their conference
participation both won scholarships to the Geneva School of International Studies in the
summer of ’31, where they got better acquainted with each other and the nexus of
economics and international affairs. After Geneva they followed parallel routes for the
better part of two decades. For starters, Kindleberger went back to Penn and onward to
graduate studies in economics at Columbia University, Ostrander to Williams and then
the same at Oxford and the University of Chicago. 3
Unlike Kindleberger, Ostrander did not finish his Ph.D. He succumbed first to an
offer of an instructorship at Williams and then to Aaron Director’s call from Washington
to run a U.S. Treasury-sponsored project for collection of tax data. But the two young
men were situated similarly once again by the latter half of 1936. From that time until
the United States’ entry into World War II, both were economists in government service
(or, in Kindleberger’s case, quasi-government service): Ostrander mostly at the Treasury
3

The biographical material in this paragraph and the following one is drawn from Kindleberger
(1991) and Ostrander (2009a; 2009b).
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Department’s Division of Monetary Research, working under Harry Dexter White,

Kindleberger mostly at the New York Fed and at the Bank of International Settlements in
Basel.
The war drew Kindleberger into the Office of Strategic Services in Washington
D.C. and London, then into the 12th Army Group in Europe, where he held the rank of
Captain and later Major. The end of the war in 1945 drew him into the State Department,
which set up a new Office of Economic Security (OES) with three divisions. Each
division concentrated on the economic and legal affairs of a different set of defeated or
neutral countries. Here the abbreviations proliferate: Kindleberger became Chief of the
Division of German and Austrian Affairs (GA) and in that capacity devised economic
policy for the Office of the Military Government, U.S. (OMGUS). In broadest terms his
charge was making the Allied agreement on reparations operational while fostering the
recovery of the countries under his purview (Kindleberger 1991, 112-120). Fostering the
recovery of Europe at large became his charge after Secretary of State George Marshall’s
famous speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947; the event occasioned his transfer inside the
State Department to an advisory role for the European Recovery Program (ERP), a.k.a.
the Marshall Plan (ibid., 122). From these positions Kindleberger made his wartime and
postwar observations on the German economy and participated in planning the monetary
reform of 1948. In the summer of that year, just as the reform was carried out, he
decamped for his new career at M.I.T.
Kindleberger’s work at GA reconnected him with Ostrander, who, after his tenure
at Treasury and subsequent positions in and out of government, had migrated to OMGUS
in Berlin in late 1945 (Ostrander 2009, 92). 4 Ostrander was chief of price control in
OMGUS and the U.S. member of the Price Control Committee at the four-power Allied
Control Council (ACC). In February of 1948 he was appointed Deputy for Negotiations
at the ACC Economic Directorate (Ostrander 1996/2001, 2), where the terms of the
monetary reform were under dispute. Physical control over printing the new money was
the stickiest point (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13:11). The Soviets wanted it; the Americans
did not want them to have it. In March, soon after Ostrander’s appointment, the top
4

Kindleberger’s contemporary report on his meeting with Ostrander in Berlin may be found in
CPK to John DeWilde, 3 Aug. 1946, in Kindleberger (1989, 6).
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Soviet member of the ACC abandoned the council, signaling the rupture between the

Soviet Union and the Western Allies. The rupture suspended the work of all the ACC
directorates. In its sequel in late June the Soviets blockaded Berlin. But before that, and
more to the point of this essay, the rupture ended the Allied impasse over monetary
reform. Like Kindleberger, only more so, Ostrander was an indirect participant in the
reform.

The German monetary reform
The reform of 1948 is not a subject lacking historical attention. Besides Kindleberger
and Ostrander’s treatment (2003) there is Buchheim (1993), Renger (1988), and
Sauermann (1979), to name just a few of the scholarly works in English. The aim here is
to review only the details necessary for explaining our two protagonists’ perspectives on
the reform in the late 1940s and then again in the late ‘90s.
In the aftermath of the war Germany remained beset by wartime monetary
impairments. Although the Hitler government had resorted to the usual expedients of war
finance, namely, explicit taxation and seigniorage, it had preferred “noiseless” methods.
It had compelled the deposit of workers’ wages in savings banks that were compelled in
turn to buy government debt. Insurance and social security funds had been under similar
compulsion. Corporations had been ordered to use retained earnings to buy treasury bills.
At the same time, businesses had been prohibited from replacing pre-war stocks of
merchandise, and any other business and consumer spending had been impeded by price
controls and rationing (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 4: 13-16). By war's end, the result was a
plethora of paper and account-book claims in a prostrate country producing few goods to
be claimed.
The Allies were on a precarious footing to grapple with that result. They agreed
at Postdam to promote the development of local German responsibility, but the monetary
problem was a national one and no national German government existed to solve it. They
agreed to reconstitute Germany as a democracy, but they also agreed to impose whatever
controls were necessary for a “balanced economy” and for distributing goods equitably

5
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during a moment of acute scarcity. 5 What it all implied for the Hitler price controls was
unclear, but from the start of the occupation the various zone commanders decided to
maintain them and in late 1945 the ACC ratified their decision (Mendershausen 1949,
647). So, for a while at least, the controls would remain and the monetary problem
would fester.
Administering the controls in the American zone fell to OMGUS (which, in late
1946, combined efforts with the British for bizonal administration) together with
subsidiary German Price Formation Offices (OMGUS 1947 [Sept.], 144-154).
Kindleberger observed the administration firsthand during his reconnaissance trip to
Berlin for GA in August 1946. The trip included multiple meetings with Ostrander and
his Price Control group. Kindleberger noted the satisfaction Ostrander took in the
efficacy of his group’s work, insofar as efficacy meant holding the line against official
price rises (CPK to John DeWilde, 4 Aug. 1946). 6 But Ostrander was not blind to the
unintended consequences of the work – and those, too, Kindleberger noted (CPK to
DeWilde, 7 Aug. 1946). 7 The consequences were manifest in the extraordinarily low
physical productivity of people. Low productivity was due partly to lack of calories.
That part of it was more or less inevitable in the immediate aftermath of the war. But it
was also due partly (and, over the next couple of years, increasingly) to people’s

calculated responses to price controls, and thus to OMGUS for maintaining the controls.
As under the Hitler government, people responded to price controls by resorting
variously to black markets and to forms of barter.
The norm favored barter: most thought it better to pay the “insurance premium”
of cumbersomeness in transactions than to brazenly flout the controls (Mendershausen
1949, 651). The main form of barter retained the use of Reichsmarks but made a trader’s
sacrifice of some units of “Good A” for Reichsmarks at official prices contingent on his
receiving some units of “Good B” for some additional A, the ratio of the contingent
transaction also being determined by official prices. One trader’s sacrifice at official
prices compensated the other’s, so a viable trade was in effect goods-for-goods at black
5

Potsdam Agreement, 2 Aug. 1945, as excerpted in Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for
Germany (1951, 6).
6
In Kindleberger (1989, 17).
7
In Kindleberger (1989, 35).
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market relative prices with some currency thrown in for a veneer of legality (OMGUS
1947 [June n.d.], 6). 8 “Compensation trade,” the authorities called it. While it
maintained a function for official prices, it was fantastically expensive. “With
compensation trade in general,” Ostrander observed, “the amount of time spent in

locating partners and consummating deals makes up a very sizable part of people’s time
and constitutes a major drag on productivity. It destroys the efficiency inherent in the
division of labor” (OMGUS 1947 [Sept.], 150). 9
By the first half of 1947 the urgency of changes in the price system was obvious,
and not only for productivity gains. Dr. Heinrich Rittershausen, chief of the German
price formation officers in the Office of Economic Administration (Verwaltungsamt für
Wirtschaft, VAW), conveyed a dire warning to the Allied policy authorities. Without
quick and conclusive action to fix money and prices, the authorities could expect “an
early collapse of the public and economic order” (OMGUS 1947 [June n.d.], 3).
The fix was monetary reform. What that entailed in general was clear enough.
New money with a new name would have to be printed and then exchanged for old
money at an appropriately small ratio of new units to old. Then, sooner or later, people
would be allowed to trade money for goods and goods for money. Stated that way
monetary reform may have seemed like a logistical question. The better way to state it
was as a question of “bring[ing] total outstanding money and monetary claims against the
government into some approximate balance with the reduced wealth and national
income” (Stolper 1948, 102). Logistics, however complicated, were as yet the lesser part
of it. Monetary reform entailed figuring out whose claims would be honored and whose
repudiated. The destruction of wealth and income wrought by the war were so vast –
perhaps a third of real wealth had been wiped out, and income reduced by half from the
8

An example drawn from real life: at official prices, 50 liters of gasoline cost 30 RM, as did 1
tire. But at black market prices 50 liters cost 600 RM while 1 tire cost 2,000 RM. A typical
owner of a tire would not trade it for 50 liters, much less for 30 RM. But if his trade of 1 tire for
50 liters (a legal transaction) could be made contingent on another transaction whereby he gave
60 RM for an additional 100 liters (also legal), then he could be persuaded to part with it. In sum,
his 1 tire plus 60 RM would get him 150 liters of gasoline. Exchanging 1 tire for 150 liters came
pretty close to black market relative prices. Parting with some extra Reichsmarks was a
transaction cost – and certainly not the biggest one that either trader faced (OMGUS 1947 [June
n.d.], 6).
9
Wolfgang Stolper (1948, 97) expressed the problem succinctly. Germany had become “a nation
spending a large part of its life in searching for the means of survival rather than working.”
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prewar level (Colm et al. 1946, 1) – that, when the figuring was done, the effects of
monetary reform would be “tantamount to a social revolution” (Stolper 1948, 102).

Finding consensus among either Allies or Germans on questions of revolutionary
scope was unlikely. The British wanted to foster a social-democratic Germany, the
French to prevent it from prospering more than France (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13: 8-9).
The Soviets aimed to nationalize industry, the Americans to decartelize it (Van Hook
2004, 53-62). As for the Germans, their ideas of fairness and property were increasingly
polarized as Social Democrats and Christian Democrats struggled over their country’s
future course (ibid., 139-149). Numerous proposals for monetary reform, embodying
equally numerous priorities, circulated from 1945 to 1948 (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, ch. 12).
As early as January 1946, Ostrander and Raymond Goldsmith, a German émigré and U.S.
State Department economist, discussed the possibility of outside consultants studying the
proposals and making recommendations to OMGUS. Their discussion gave impetus to a
commission ultimately comprising three men: Goldsmith; Gerhard Colm, another
German-born U.S. government economist; and Joseph M. Dodge, a Detroit banker and
financial adviser to the chief of OMGUS, General Lucius D. Clay (Kindleberger and
Ostrander 1997, 170, 176-177). The Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report, submitted to
General Clay on May 20, 1946, was the main reference point for official discussions of
monetary reform for the next two years. It did not reflect consensus among Allies or
Germans but helped guide a decision.
The Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report recommended monetary reform in three steps
(Colm et al. 1946). (1) A new currency, the Deutsche Mark, would be created and all
monetary claims including private debts written down to 10 DM = 100 RM. Reich debt
would be the exception: it would be totally invalidated. Prices, wages, rents, and taxes in
the new currency would remain as they were in the old. Freeing them would be future
business. (2) In order to reduce disparities owing to the first step, 50% of the value
beyond 1,000 DM of each person’s real estate, plant, equipment, and inventories would
be mortgaged, with title to the mortgage being vested in the government. The mortgages
would finance the government’s issuance of certificates promising partial compensation
for bombing or other war losses. (3) In order to reduce disparities further and finance
more compensation for war losses, the government would levy a progressive capital tax
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ranging from 10 to 90 percent on each person’s net worth after accounting for the first
and second steps.
So went the recommendations. The reality of monetary reform would differ in

several ways, large and small. Allied objections would have to be either overridden or
accommodated. German objections, too, would have to be heard for reasons both
principled and practical. The principle guiding OMGUS’s work under General Clay was
“chaperonage,” which was to say, governing Germany so as to give Germans increasing
responsibility of self-government (Ostrander 1998, 4-5). The practical consideration was
that if, as the German price officials said, “the public and economic order” was at stake,
then prudence counseled crafting a reform in which Germans would acquiesce.
By the middle of 1947, a year after the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report was finished,
progress in crafting the reform had stopped. A pair of logistical questions began to rival
the revolutionary ones in importance. Who would print the new currency, and where?
The Americans proposed to do the work at Germany’s national printing plant, which
happened to be in the American sector of Berlin, but to assuage the other Allies by
putting the plant under four-power control. The Soviets first demanded control of their
own set of plates, which would allow them to print the currency independently without
real constraint; then, agreeing in principle to four-power control over printing, they
proposed German control over issuance and management. But no German institution of
control existed, nor could it exist until the Allies resolved their broader disagreement
about forms and powers of German institutions. The Americans smelled Soviet delay
tactics (Bennett 1950, 43-46). Anyway the result was deadlock.
By the fall of 1947, OMGUS authorities saw greater danger in continued delay than
in a split from the Soviets and a divided Germany. The lag between ordering the
currency to be printed and “C-Day,” when it would be distributed, would be about 9
months. It was a long time to wait: long enough, perhaps, for the spreading economic rot
to incubate communist reaction. Longer could not be allowed. Orders for the new
currency were placed with U.S. printers while OMGUS set to work with renewed effort
to settle the details of monetary reform with British, French, and German authorities.
OMGUS attempts to win Soviet agreement continued, but with diminishing hope and
determination to go ahead in any event (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13: 13-15; Buchheim 1993,

9
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Spearheading the efforts with the British, French, and Germans were Jack Bennett,

director of the OMGUS Finance Division, and his deputy, Edward A. Tenenbaum. The
latter was a young man of 25, already accomplished beyond his years. His undergraduate
senior thesis on the Nazi economy was published by Yale University Press; his wartime
service as an Air Force intelligence officer earned him a bronze star. 10 As much as
Kindleberger and Ostrander, the rest of the story turns on him.
Besides intellect, determination, and knowledge of the subject at hand, Tenenbaum
had other useful qualities. He was fluent in French and German. Above all, despite his
youth, he was prepared temperamentally to plough through Allied and German obstacles
to American designs. His father, Joseph L. Tenenbaum, had been a notable surgeon and
author, vice president of the World Jewish Congress and the American Zionist
Organization, founder and chairman of the Joint Boycott Council, and, particularly in the
latter capacity, an early and vocal enemy of the Hitler government. 11 Edward
Tenenbaum knew his father’s work on the Joint Boycott Council. He had used the
Council’s records in writing his thesis (Tenenbaum 1942, 39, fn 79). He understood “the
principle of contagion inherent in totalitarian control” (ibid., 21) and could uproot the
institutions of control without remorse. For Germans especially he had scant remorse.
“Not averse as a nation to self-pity,” he would later write, Germany comprised multitudes
treating the misery of repressed inflation as an excuse to maintain the monetary
institutions causing the repressed inflation (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 12: 13).
Bennett delegated to Tenenbaum the responsibility for coordinating American and
German designs for currency reform. The instrument for promoting German designs was
the Special Bureau of Money and Credit (Sonderstelle Geld und Kredit), a body of
liberal-minded economists and politicians that was established for that purpose and
chaired by Ludwig Erhard, erstwhile Economics Minister of Bavaria (Van Hook 2004,
157). The stenographic report of Tenenbaum’s first meeting with the Special Bureau, on

10

Tenenbaum’s senior thesis is given in the bibliography as Tenenbaum (1942). His wartime
accomplishment is cited in his obituary: “E.A. Tenenbaum, Overseas Economist, Dies,” The
Washington Post, Friday, 31 October, 1975, p. A24.
11
Biographical details for the elder Tenenbaum taken from his obituary: “Joseph L. Tenenbaum
Dies; Urologist, Zionist, Author, 74,” The New York Times, Monday, 11 December, 1961.
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November 20, 1947, gives evidence of his authority and his compass.

Tenenbaum dominated the meeting, emphasizing the need for cooperation, hearing
the Germans’ ideas, and pointing the way helpfully toward their better alignment with his
own. Bureau members wanted a higher ratio of new currency exchangeable for old.
Tenenbaum, seeing the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith proposal of 10:100 as too lenient, said
that 5:100 would suffice, and any more than that should be “blocked” (meaning held in
account but not available for the individual’s withdrawal) (Kindleberger 1997, 2-3).
Erhard hoped that, absent a higher ratio, the Marshall Plan aid announced the previous
summer might be siphoned off for consumption. Tenenbaum retorted that “the Marshall
Plan does not mean help for consumer goods” (ibid., 6). Erhard worried that cancelling
up to 80% of private debt such as mortgages, leaving “only” 20% valid, would amount to
“unlawful enrichment” of homeowners. Tenenbaum was “perhaps ready to reduce all
mortgages to 12 percent, and then finish with it” (ibid., 4). One member was anxious
about the adequacy of time for exchanging currency beginning C-Day. Tenenbaum said
that 24 hours were enough (ibid., 5). Tenenbaum’s purport was parsimony, decisiveness,
and indifference about the fine details of currency reform’s distributive effects. 12
Notwithstanding their differences, on at least one point Tenenbaum did not see fit
to correct the Special Bureau. Although Germans should attend to details, said Erhard,
“the Allies must impose currency reform.” Concurred another, “I have always felt that
democracy is more tolerant than dictatorship, but with currency matters, I call for the
occupation authority” (ibid., 2). The Americans sought the semblance of German
participation, the Germans the assurance of Allied leadership.
The assurance was fulfilled the following spring. Aiding its fulfillment was the
Soviet break from Allies at their main body of deliberation, the Allied Control Council,
on March 20, 1948. The Soviet walkout happened a week after the U.S. Senate passed
legislation implementing the Marshall Plan, a month after the communist coup in
Czechoslovakia, and a month, too, after the United States, Great Britain, France, and the
Benelux countries began talks in London to determine jointly the form of a West German
government. The events were closely related. Fear of Soviet expansion and communist
12

On other occasions, if not at the meeting of November 20, 1947, the members of the Special
Bureau may have been of the same mind. Buchheim (1993, 95) gives evidence suggesting they
had been so earlier in 1947.
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takeover in Europe helped turn American public opinion toward approving the Marshall
Plan; the plan itself stipulated European cooperation as a condition of aid, and thereby

fostered European resolve in uniting and fixing Western Germany; and the prospect of a
united West Germany, and moreover a united non-communist Europe, hardened Soviet
resolve to prevent its realization (Behrman 2007, chs. 7, 9; Smith 1990, 462-481). That
story is now lore. What matters here are its implications for monetary reform. With the
Soviets excluded from Allied deliberations and the die cast for a divided Germany, the
deadlock over monetary reform was broken and the way cleared for assertion of Allied,
and specifically American, leadership.
At the end of April, the Western Allies held a secret conclave at a military
installation in Rothwesten, near Kassel in Hessen, to work out the final details of
monetary reform. The 49-day conclave included Germans experts appointed by Erhard’s
Special Bureau plus liaisons for the three Military Governments. The OMGUS liaison
was Tenenbaum (Kindleberger and Ostrander 2003, 180). The Western Allies had
already converged toward, if not yet arrived at, a solution nearer to Colm-DodgeGoldsmith than to German designs. After vacillation in Washington and debate at
Rothwesten, the solution remained in the same neighborhood. On these matters the
Germans would have the opportunity to speak but not the responsibility to decide. “The
monetary reform, however much it may have met the yearnings and needs of the German
public,” recalled Tenenbaum (ca. 1958, 13: 19), “was in fact dictated by a Military
Government that professed to be trying to introduce democracy. It would be ridiculous to
deny this.”
The monetary reform that came out of Rothwesten was imposed in Western
Germany beginning June 20, 1948. It substituted Deutsche Marks for Reichsmarks at
10:100, with 5 of the 10 blocked and a decision to be made about unblocking them in 90
days. The final ratio was 6.5:100. Everyone was allowed to exchange 60 marks at 1:1,
paid in two installments over a month’s time, but those 60 were charged against the total
bought at 10:100 (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13: 34). 13 Most private debts were written down
10:100. The U.S. War Department vetoed steps (2) and (3) of Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith:
13

There is a discrepancy between Tenenbaum’s (ca. 1958, 13: 34) and Buchheim’s (1993, 109)
treatment of the 60-mark quota.
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collectivizing war losses and capital taxation, especially at progressive rates ranging up to
practical confiscation, were measures the United States would not dictate. They would
be left for Germany to decide. Reich debt would be annulled completely (Buchheim
1993, 109-111; Kindleberger and Ostrander 2003, 180-190). Taken as a whole the
reform was a good deal more parsimonious, more likely to reduce the quantity of money
to a level commensurate with official prices and the growth of money to a rate
commensurate with Germany’s capacity to produce, than either German designs or
certain French and British proposals at Rothwesten (Buchheim 1993, 107; Tenenbaum
ca. 1958, 13: 33-34;). It was not nearly parsimonious enough for Tenenbaum. But he
reckoned “it might easily have been much worse” (ibid., 33).
To Kindleberger the results were of “the nature of a miracle.” In June 1948
German industrial production was 50% of the 1936 average; by February 1949 it was at
80%. In 1946 exports had been valued at $160 million; by the end of 1948 they were at
$850 million annually (Kindleberger [1949] 1987, 34). Kindleberger did not credit
monetary reform alone for the miracle: other changes in German economic
administration, especially the simultaneous scrapping of price controls by Ludwig
Erhard, who was by then Bizonal Economic Director, also helped (ibid., 35; Van Hook
2004, 139). Nevertheless he saw monetary reform as the main cause.
From August 1948, Kindleberger watched the miracle unfold from his new position
as Associate Professor of Economics at M.I.T. From that perspective he might have seen
a deeper cause in the circumstances that made reform possible. The dominant leadership
of a nation, say, like the United States absent effective Soviet opposition; or that of an

individual, like Tenenbaum absent a rival with comparable authority and will. The reader
will perceive that the story as told here invites one to see it that way. But the telling is
informed by Kindleberger’s work during a prolific career, and also during a productive
retirement, in which he revisited the German monetary reform with a different purpose
than he had early in his tenure at M.I.T. For him to adopt that purpose took a while.

Leadership
Indeed Kindleberger wrote little about the monetary reform he watched unfold in 19481949 until the 1980s. He mentioned it now and then. Like the Marshall Plan, it was an

13
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episode in the “clash between the United States and the Soviet Union over economic

recovery in Europe” ([1968] 1987, 101). European recovery after the World War II was
not a major subject of his writing between the 1950s, when it was effected, and the early
1970s, when he published The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Nevertheless it was in
this period that he developed his ideas about leadership in the international economy that
came to be seen as the core of “hegemonic stability” theory. In the ideas’ later stages of
development they spurred his reconsideration of immediate post-war events. The
question to be taken up now is, what about their early stages of development? What were
the ideas’ nature and application before, and then during, his writing The World in
Depression?
During all of the period from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, and even before,
Kindleberger wrote of the importance of building international economic institutions and
coordinating economic policy. He even pondered the prospects for U.S. “dominance” of
the international economy. Yet few of his ponderings resembled a theory, and what did
was markedly different from his later writings. In The Dollar Shortage (1950, 254) he
determined that “a cooperative effort ... unique in world experience” was required to
address the balance-of-payments problem of countries in urgent need of U.S. goods and
capital. But the determination only concluded his analysis of the problem. The analysis
was economic not political. A few years later, in an essay on “The Role of the United
States in the European Economy, 1919-1950,” he seized on François Perroux’s theory of
economic domination. But as far as he was concerned its relevance lay only in the
implication that “whether it wills it or not, the United States by all its actions affects what
goes on in Europe” (Kindleberger [1954] 1966, 230). This was how he understood U.S.
domination of Europe. International economics, not international political economy, was
his province.
In the late 1950s and 1960s he moved haltingly toward the other province, with a
twist. In an essay for Perroux’s own journal, Cahiers de l’Institut de Science
Économique Apliqueé (1961), Kindleberger saw before him “La fin du rôle dominant des
États-Unis” (as he began the essay’s title). In contrast to his later view in The World in
Depression, he seemed unperturbed by the prospect of the United States’ diminished role.
The responsibility of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of international payments
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should lie first with each particular country, said Kindleberger, then with the IMF, and

then some institution of broader international cooperation. Only then should the U.S. be
responsible, and even then not uniquely (Kindleberger 1961, 97). Likewise for the
responsibility of aiding economic development (ibid., 104). The U.S. should exercise
“leadership,” but only on the basis of equality and economic symmetry: it should take the
character of “le do as I do” not “le do as I say” (ibid., 105, italics in original). This
notion of leadership did not match his later one.
It would appear that Kindleberger entered the realm of international political
economy awkwardly, speaking pidgin, because he was unsure he belonged there.
Another of his few and uncertain forays was titled “International Political Theory From
Outside” (1959, italics added) – an article, like the one he wrote for Cahiers, that
suggested a U.S. role more aptly described as collaboratorship than leadership. 14 Adding
to the appearance is a remark he wrote in a memorandum for a consultative committee of
thirty top economists, himself included, serving the administrations of Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson. Concerned about the state of “Franco-American rivalry for
political leadership ... and their relative prestige” in the summer of 1965, Kindleberger
confessed that “as a technical economist, I am perhaps not competent” to speak to the
issue. 15 And then he proceeded to try. Consistent with his other efforts during these
years, he suggested the U.S. should muffle rather than amplify its pretentions to
leadership. 16
Kindleberger’s famous thesis of the indispensability of leadership in The World in
Depression (1973) was therefore a significant turn from where he had stood less than a
decade before. He signaled it early in Power and Money: The Economics of
International Politics and the Politics of International Economics (1970), the source of
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“The United States cannot shift to the long-run basis of maximization by itself. But if the
Soviet Union were to extend its horizon, and the United States to follow ...” (Kindleberger 1959,
82).
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“Issues and Positions in International Monetary Arrangements,” 26 July 1965. In Kindleberger
(1934-1995), Box 4, folder “Treasury Dept.”
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In Kindleberger’s words, “the most productive stance we can take is to ignore considerations of
prestige entirely. Prestige can best be served in these matters [of international monetary
arrangements] by contributions to common goals ... I believe it would be a mistake to try to
preserve the dollar as a reserve currency, except on grounds of efficiency, if this be the efficient
path” (Ibid.)
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the epigraph at the beginning of this essay. He signaled it more tellingly in

correspondence with Gunnar Myrdal in the same year. Piqued by Myrdal’s The
Challenge of World Poverty (1970), Kindleberger told him “I am particularly interested
in what you say about leadership.” He was working on the 1929 World Depression, he
continued, “and take as a basic explanation the inability of the British to furnish
economic leadership to the system, and the unwillingness of the United States.” He
thought Myrdal correct to say that U.S. leadership in international economic affairs was
currently crumbling, but wrong to rejoice in it, as “there will be chaos when it is gone
unless it is replaced by some other.” Replacement by any party was hardly likely;
replacement by any party more enlightened than the U.S. was even less so. Myrdal was
rooting for such replacement but did not say how it would happen. Kindleberger ended
pointedly, “Does a social scientist like you think it likely to be forthcoming as a result of
preaching?” (CPK to Myrdal, 24 July 1970). 17
The leadership thesis appeared in The World in Depression’s culminating
fourteenth chapter. For present purposes the summary in the foregoing letter will do. The
rest of this essay is about what happed to the thesis afterward, through Kindleberger’s
elaborations, other authors’ responses, and his rejoinder.

Hegemonic stability
Kindleberger’s first major elaboration was in Manias, Panics, and Crashes (1978). By
extending his canvas temporally to the start of the 18th century and geographically to
Western Europe he could discuss more and varied financial crises. To Kindleberger,
what the history of the Great Depression showed vividly, a larger sampling of financial
crises confirmed unmistakably. Responsibility for stability was a public good. The
greater were the benefits conferred by a public good, the smaller was the incentive to
provide it privately. Enter the “international lender of last resort.” For somebody or
some nation to step forward in that role even when private incentives counseled
otherwise was the function of leadership (Kindleberger 1978, 3-4, 220-226).
But the canvas of Manias, Panics, and Crashes did not go as far as the Second
17

Myrdal answered “Yes” (Myrdal to CPK, 4 August 1970). Both letters are in Kindleberger
(1934-1995), Box 2, folder “M, correspondence, 1946-87.”
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World War. From postwar Western Europe Kindleberger drew no lessons. By his own
account, it was invitations to help commemorate the 1947 Harvard speech of Secretary
George C. Marshall, first in 1977 and then again in 1982, that got him started in that
direction (Kindleberger [1978] 1987, 120). His reflections informed his next major
monograph, A Financial History of Western Europe (1984).

Part V of Financial History concentrated on the postwar period. The Marshall Plan
got major billing: it allowed Kindleberger to show distinctly the difference between, on
one hand, the “key-currency and key-region philosophy” that he advocated for relief,
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and payments stability; and, on the other, the “worldwide
approach” proposed by champions of the UN, World Bank, and IMF (Kindleberger 1984,
403). The German monetary reform had its place in the book, too, although it did less
work. Whereas the Marshall Plan was unambiguously a case of U.S. leadership,
monetary reform was apparently a case of shared responsibility between the U.S., Great
Britain, and France. Whereas the Marshall Plan had direct repercussions to international
economic stability, monetary reform’s repercussions were felt directly in Western
Germany. Still, in a minor way the story of monetary reform supported the leadership
thesis. It illustrated the “political vacuum in which policy in the general interest was
possible” (Kindleberger 1984, 419). Which was to say, the general interest was served
by economic policy leadership, and, as the German monetary reform showed, leadership
was more likely to emerge from a political vacuum than from a bunch of contending
equals.
By this time Kindleberger’s leadership thesis had garnered popularity for kindred
ideas in the field of international relations (e.g. Gilpin 1975; Krasner 1976). Other
authors developed the thesis and rebranded it. 18 Robert Keohane (1980, 132) dubbed it
“the theory of hegemonic stability,” and although Kindleberger (1986b, 289, note 1;
1986c, 841) did not care for it, the name stuck. McKeown (1983), Lawson (1983), Stein
(1984), and Gowa (1984), among others, wrote articles in direct reference to the theory so
dubbed, all of them citing Kindleberger as well as Keohane. Keohane himself surveyed
the growing literature and plotted its course in his book, After Hegemony: Cooperation
18
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and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984). But the course Keohane proposed
spelled trouble for the theory as Kindleberger understood it.

Kindleberger’s “main lesson” in The World in Depression was that “for the world
economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer – one stabilizer” (1973, 105). The
one stabilizer, he admitted, need not necessarily be a nation (the U.S.) or even a tightly
integrated bloc of nations (Europe). It could be a nexus of international regimes: “a
world central bank, a world capital market, and an effective General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade” (1973, 308). He conceded that the latter was “the most attractive” –
but, he added, “because difficult, the least likely” (ibid.). The implication was that the
world would do best with the U.S. or Europe in the lead, and if the reader wondered
whether it was realistic to expect Europe to take the role, then he was left with one viable
option. Kindleberger did not hazard to spell it out.
The concession that leadership by international regimes was “the most attractive”
option was an affirming nod to those, like Myrdal, who blanched at the thought of U.S.
hegemony. It probably made Kindleberger’s thesis more palatable outside the U.S. and
in circles friendly to international regimes, not least in academia. The trouble was that it
encouraged inquiry along different lines than Kindleberger had in mind: not “How can a
revival of U.S. leadership be fostered?” but instead “How can the option that is ‘most
attractive’ but ‘least likely’ be made more likely? In what forms is it most likely?” Such
were Keohane’s lines of inquiry. His conclusion was that hegemony was useful for the
establishment of regimes, but, when that work was done, could very well be supplanted
by them. In his words, “cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a
hegemonic leader after international regimes have been established. Post-hegemonic
cooperation is also possible” (Keohane 1984, 32).
Kindleberger’s presidential address to the American Economic Association two
years later offered a prominent stage for a rejoinder. “I am a realist when it comes to
regimes,” he said: “it seems to me that the momentum set in motion by hegemonic power
... runs down pretty quickly unless it is sustained by powerful commitment”
(Kindleberger 1986a, 10). The most fruitful course lay in persuading the nation with the
power to provide international public goods to wield it, not devolve it. Anyway,
hegemony was hardly as unattractive as the boosters of “post-hegemonic cooperation”
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This was the point that Kindleberger, now in his seventy-sixth year, wished to
contribute to the literature that he had inspired but had gotten away from him. To support
it he would need new evidence, or maybe a new take on old evidence.

Octogenarian collaboration
The spark that led to Kindleberger’s reconnection with F. Taylor Ostrander in their
octogenary decade, followed by their collaboration on a new study of the German
monetary reform, was not anybody’s conviction that such a study would support
Kindleberger’s interpretation of hegemonic stability. That came later. It was Ostrander’s
reading A Financial History of Western Europe, finding two small discrepancies between
his own memory of the reform and Kindleberger’s, and pointing them out to his erstwhile
assistant in OMGUS Price Control, Samuel I. Katz (FTO to Katz, 24 May 1990). 19
The discrepancies concerned the original inspiration of the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith
commission. In Financial History Kindleberger credited one Manuel Gottlieb of
OMGUS Finance Division for suggesting the currency reform; Ostrander denied that
Gottlieb mattered much. Kindleberger credited his own State Department for having
appointed the commission (not for having “proposed” it, as Ostrander construed him
incorrectly to mean); Ostrander insisted that he and Goldsmith together cooked up the
idea (Kindleberger 1984, 412; FTO to Katz, 24 May 1990, 4). These were insignificant
details in the big picture. Ostrander himself considered them personally fascinating but
worth maybe “a footnote” in history books (ibid.). Nevertheless, after he settled into
retirement in 1990 with a spacious basement library and a lifetime’s collection of papers,
he had time and means to write for whatever purpose pleased him, even footnotes. In
1992 he wrote up a friendly memo to Kindleberger to set the record straight. 20
Kindleberger accepted the correction thankfully. It impelled him to change no

19

Katz had become a professor of economics at Georgetown University. The letter is in
Ostrander (1945-2003), Box “Dept. of Defense Conference,” Folder “FTO Papers prepared for
Dept. of Defense Conference.”
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“F. Taylor Ostrander – Experience in Post-War Germany,” typescript, 10 March 1992. Receipt
acknowledged by Kindleberger in CPK to FTO, 14 March 1992 (in Ostrander [1945-2003], Box
“Dept. of Defense Conference,” Folder “FTO Papers prepared for Dept. of Defense Conference”).
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more than 10 words in the second edition of Financial History. 21 More significantly he

probed Ostrander’s memories. He asked about Ludwig Erhard’s role, which he thought
was overhyped by the likes of Milton Friedman, Gottfried Haberler, and even Paul
Samuelson. He asked for information about Tenenbaum, and also about the U.S. War
Department’s veto of steps (2) and (3) of Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith. And he suggested that
Ostrander keep to the subject and add to his account (CPK to FTO, 14 March 1992). 22
Ostrander answered the queries. Erhard’s role was the lifting of most price
controls, but he “had nothing at all to do with M[onetary] R[eform]” per se. Tenenbaum
was a “strange, unlikable type,” although “brilliant” and capable of working out the fine
details of the reform; “but he does not deserve a larger place in history than this.” About
the U.S. veto of the collectivization of war losses and capital taxation, Ostrander knew
nothing firsthand. The answers earned Kindleberger’s thanks and another nudge to
pursue the subject at length (FTO to CPK, 4 April 1992; CPK to FTO, 10 April 1992). 23
But the larger purpose of Ostrander’s specific answers, let alone the purpose of a
lengthier account of the German monetary reform, was as yet unclear. Kindleberger’s
nudging did nothing to clarify it; his own notion seems to have been muddled. Was it
merely an exercise of fact checking for erudite retirees with (post) war stories to tell?
Ostrander anticipated the critique. In correspondence with Katz in the spring of
1990, his inclination had been to seek lessons of the German monetary reform for similar
reforms in Eastern bloc nations freed from the Soviet yoke (FTO to Katz, 24 May 1990,
op cit.). But he did not follow the inclination very far, as he was unsure of the lessons’
relevance in utterly changed circumstances (ibid., 3). In the spring of 1992 he followed it
farther, this time in regard to the former Soviet Socialist Republics cast loose by the
U.S.S.R.’s demise. He was encouraged by Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment
for the U.S. Department of Defense, who invited him to present his thoughts at a small
two-hour conference at Harvard that March.
The Harvard conference’s question was, “What does our experience in aiding
German economic reconstruction after World War II teach us about how to aid Russian
21
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reconstruction today?” (Marshall to FTO, 27 February 1992). 24 Weighing answers were
a dozen economic and foreign policy experts from journalism, academia, and

government. Besides Marshall and Ostrander, the slated participants were Robert Bartley
of the Wall Street Journal editorial page; Kindleberger, Rudiger Dornbusch, and J.
Bradford DeLong; Defense Department representatives Zalmay Khalilzad (then Assistant
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Planning) and Abram Shulsky (then a consultant
for the Office of Net Assessment); and a handful of others. 25 The answers Ostrander
drew up were these: if the former Soviet lands did not join in a single new currency
replacing the Ruble, they would disintegrate economically. Timing of currency reform
was important, as a competent administration would be needed to pull it off, and any
administration would have to be assembled from the wreckage of the old. And
fashioning a Soviet currency reform that was at once democratic and effective would
require “super-human efforts” (Ostrander 1992a, 2). 26 The problem with the answers was
just what Ostrander had sensed two years before. Maybe they were right, but they did not
give much practical advice for monetary reforms in new times and different lands (1992a,
1; 1992b, 1, 3, 5).
Perhaps a more detailed study of the German monetary reform would substantiate
the answers better. Then again one could ask: So what?
Curiously, while Kindleberger and Ostrander groped for a compelling purpose for
reconsidering the German monetary reform, one possibility sat right beside them at the
Harvard conference. Khalilzad and Shulsky were authors at various stages of a draft
document for “Defense Planning Guidance” circulating in the Pentagon that spring (Burr
2008). The document, written under the supervision of Under Secretary Paul Wolfowitz,
undertook to revise defense policy strategy for a new international order with no Soviet
Union and no threat of conventional war on a global scale. It held most notably that the
new order entailed new responsibility, which the United States should bear for the
24
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world’s benefit as well as its own. Also that, in order to exercise responsibility

effectively, “our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential
future global competitor.” 27 The document was positively Kindlebergerian. Its final
version used historical analogy to support its conclusions (U.S. Secretary of Defense
1993, 8-9). It was leaked to the New York Times and referenced in a front-page story
shortly before the conference (Tyler 1992). But this author has seen no record of its
making any impression on Kindleberger and Ostrander.
The nascent reconsideration of the German monetary reform lay dormant for five
more years. Then Kindleberger revived it in vexation. In 1997, Amity Shlaes published
a story in The New Yorker celebrating the success of the Deutschemark and asking, “Can
the Euro take its place?” It depends, was her answer. What miffed Kindleberger was not
her answer but the historical sketch behind it. Shlaes said that the “priest” of the German
economic miracle, which was initiated by the monetary reform, was Ludwig Erhard
(Shlaes 1997, 188).
Shlaes’s article was the “straw that broke the camel’s back.” It prompted
Kindleberger to suggest again that Ostrander should undertake a study of the monetary
reform, now imagined as a collaborative effort led by Kindleberger. “Only some part of
the story would be to knife Erhard further,” he wrote; “I did that in Fin[ancial] Hist[ory]
of Western Europe” (CPK to FTO, 3 May 1997). 28 The rest of the aim he did not explain
– indeed did not appear to know, as shortly thereafter he wrote an aide-mémoire for the
collaboration that stated its “particular focus” to be “on the fable that [the monetary
reform] was the work of Ludwig Erhard” (CPK, 8 May 1997). 29 Anyway, Ostrander
accepted the proposition and the two men got to work swapping ideas and references as
preliminaries for the first draft.
Kindleberger finished the draft on July 24. Its stated purposes were multiple. “The
initial purpose in writing this paper was to disabuse many scholars in the United States
who call the monetary reform of June 1948 the work of Ludwig Erhard,” it began. Some
“limited personal interest in how the so-called Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report ... got its
27
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start” was acknowledged. But “of far greater importance” were several other questions
that it promised to address. What was the effect of monetary reform compared to the
effects of other policies and events on the German recovery? How important was

government action compared to the autonomous action of financial markets in effecting
reform? “[W]as a military occupation necessary to effect a drastic monetary reform that
the Germans would not have been able to accomplish by themselves?” Was the yearslong delay in implementing reform helpful or harmful? Was the plan for the equalization
of war losses that the U.S. War Department vetoed truly important for reform? And
besides those big questions some smaller “technical” ones: whether for purposes of
monetary reform it is appropriate to treat private and public debts differently; whether
blocking part of the converted currency is a good idea; what sort of banking, tax, and
government-expenditure policies should go along with the reform. 30 It was not
Kindleberger’s finest introduction, and it would remain a mess even in the final product.
But there would be some signal changes along the way.
A few days after finishing the first draft Kindleberger received a much-awaited
delivery. Earlier in July he had read an article by Eckhard Wandel (1979) that resulted in
his “raising [his] valuation of the shares of Tenenbaum” (CPK to FTO, ca. 5 July 1997).
He had seen Wandel’s mention of Tenenbaum’s unfinished history of the German Mark
(Tenenbaum ca. 1958), cited earlier in this essay but not then widely known, and,
following Wandel’s trail, had sent away for it from the Truman Presidential Library. The
photocopied manuscript arrived on July 29 (CPK to FTO, 29 July 1997). Kindleberger
dove into it. On July 31 he reported to Ostrander, “I have finished reading Tenenbaum
and I must say I think it remarkable ... As far as I’m concerned, it’s back to the drawing
board” (CPK to FTO, 31 July 1997).
Parts of Tenenbaum’s account of the negotiations for monetary reform in late 1947
and the first half of 1948 have already been quoted. “The monetary reform ... was in fact
dictated by a Military Government that professed to be trying to introduce democracy,”
he observed (ca. 1958, 13: 19). What bears noting is the shade of difference between
Tenenbaum’s observation and Kindleberger’s original inkling that “a military occupation
30
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[was] necessary to effect a dramatic monetary reform.” The difference lay in

Tenenbaum’s word, “dictated.” In several parts of the unfinished manuscript Tenenbaum
elaborated with vivid detail. One plan to substitute repressed inflation with open inflation
followed by a decrease in the growth of the money stock (and thus a dramatic but onetime rise in prices), rather with an absolute decrease in the money stock, was beaten back
by Tenenbaum with unspecified assistance from Ostrander and one other (ibid., 12: 21,
45). Other plans he beat back by his own devices. At the Rothwesten conclave,
Tenenbaum reported, with the German, French, and British representatives all favoring
one element or another of the relatively mild German proposal, only the American
representative spoke all three languages. “There are allegations that I took advantage of
my position as interpreter to force American views on my colleagues, as well as on the
Germans,” he deadpanned. “At this late date it may be safe to confess that these
allegations are correct” (ibid., 13: 22-23).
Tenenbaum felt no compunction about using “force” to see American views
prevail, for monetary reforms were “by their very nature citatorial and conspiratorial.” In
order to avoid a wave of speculation the public had to be kept in the dark. Parliamentary
deliberation was out of the question. But, what was more, why give Germans much of a
say even in secretive deliberations out of the public eye? “We seriously doubted the
wisdom of saddling the weak German government with the enormous responsibility and
onus of currency reform.” Deliberating with the other Western allies was more
necessary, but even so, the United States was the preeminent power among them and had
the responsibility to use that power for “reestablishing law and order in the economic
field,” for “liquidating economic dictatorship.” Any democratic state could rightfully use
“emergency police powers” to those ends. It went without saying that the U.S. Military
Government could, too (ibid., 13: 17-19).
With these revelations from Tenenbaum’s manuscript in mind, Kindleberger began
rewriting. On August 14 he sent Ostrander the second draft (CPK to FTO, 14 Aug.
1997). With 31 pages of text, it was about three times longer than the first, contained a
substantially modified introduction, and had an utterly different conclusion. Whereas the
first draft had merely asked (among other questions) whether military government was
necessary for dramatic reform, the second inquired whether “an autocratic benevolent
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despot from outside” was necessary. 31 Whereas the first draft had concluded with some

bland technical remarks about the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report, the second was replete
with observations about Tenenbaum and the implications of what he did. “Tenenbaum
writes that currency reforms are inherently conspiratorial,” wrote Kindleberger, adding
that “perhaps it is less inflammatory to suggest that in complex financial matters which
may roil economic and financial behavior there is something to be said for benevolent
despotism.” 32 In this case, “the despot ... was Edward Tenenbaum.” 33 Finally,
Kindleberger challenged the view that a monetary reform like the one Tenenbaum
delivered “must be ‘unpopular, unfair, arbitrary, and ineffective’”:

Unpopular, perhaps and requiring despotic powers to cut through. Arbitrary,
perhaps, and mistakes would inevitably be made. Unfair? Not necessarily ... .
Ineffective seems clearly wrong in the German case. It is sad for the social sciences
that democratic institutions sometimes fail at drastic financial surgery. It is
consoling, however, that a successful operation, even on that fell a bit short of
fairness in the German case, can strengthen democratic habits and institutions. 34

Despot, despotism, despotic. For initiates to hegemonic stability theory there could have
been little doubt about what Kindleberger had seen in Tenenbaum’s manuscript and how
it had changed the project. To Kindleberger, it was “sad for the social sciences” that
democracy was not always fit for the economic tasks at hand, but so it went, and the
social scientists had to face the fact. Leadership was necessary, as he had observed all
along. Doyens of the academic field of international relations could not skirt around the
fact by fostering deliberative “regimes” to provide leadership without hegemony.
Deliberation was unreliable. The fact remained. It had to acknowledged forthrightly –
even when the alternative to deliberation was “despotism.”
Ostrander, however, was not among the initiates. He was puzzled by the sudden
appearance and insistent repetition of “despot” and its variants. The word was absent in
31
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the first draft. Something was amiss. He lay awake at night trying to work it out – then

rose in the wee hours to register his qualms (FTO to CPK, 10 Sept. 1997). “What is the
intended audience,” Ostrander asked Kindleberger, and “what is the purpose of the
piece?” As to purpose, was it to show that despotism could be benevolent if it had
positive effects? “If one intends to praise American Military Government action,”
Ostrander averred, “‘despot’ seems an inappropriate word in this context” (ibid.,
emphasis in the original).
To this Kindleberger responded with his own softish despotism. Ostrander had
asked about purpose, Kindleberger acknowledged a few days later. “Here is where we
may have different ideas that must be resolved for the collaboration to work,” he replied.
The second draft, he said pointedly, stated the purposes clearly: to disabuse scholars
about Erhard’s role, to say something about the origins of the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith
report, and, above all, to ask and answer a series of questions about currency reform.
Then going from pointed to cutting: “These are scholarly interests. I pretend to be a
scholar. ... Your interest Taylor, it seems to me is to educate a wider public, those who
read for example, the NYTimes M[a]gazine Section, The Atlantic, or Harpers” (CPK to
FTO, 15 Sept. 1997).
Kindleberger opportunely avoided the “despotism” question and thereby missed the
point. He did not answer the question, did not even admit it. Nor did he need to, as
scholarship was ostensibly his province not Ostrander’s. “Despot” would stay, whether
Ostrander liked it not.
The word stayed because it served the deeper purpose that the collaboration had
taken on. The purpose did not relate particularly to Erhard or Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith or
even monetary reform – although it did relate, as Kindleberger said, to “scholarly
interests.” It was to turn the scholarly conversation away from post-hegemonic
cooperation and toward the restoration of leadership, as Kindleberger understood it.

Conclusion
After beginning their work but before wrapping it up, Kindleberger and Ostrander found
its outlet (CPK to FTO, 7 October 1997). 35 They presented it at a conference on “The
35
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International Financial System, Past and Present,” organized by the German Historical
Institute and held at Princeton University, in April 1998. The conference yielded a
volume edited by Marc Flandreau, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, and Harold James and
published in 2003. Kindleberger and Ostrander’s contribution appears therein, titled
“The 1948 Monetary Reform in Western Germany” and modified but little from the

second draft. The inset quotation from the section above appears in its entirety, with only
trivial changes, as the chapter’s concluding sentences (Kindleberger and Ostrander 2003,
192).
The published volume reached Kindleberger the month before he died at age 92
(CPK to FTO, 13 June 2003). 36 In the decade since, Kindleberger and Ostrander’s
contribution has not registered in the literature of international relations and political
economy. 37 But it may yet. In their new preface for the fortieth-anniversary reprint of
The World in Depression, J. Bradford DeLong and Barry Eichengreen (2013) remark on
the continuing relevance of “Kindleberger’s ‘theory of hegemonic stability’” during a
time of world financial distress and U.S. political dysfunction. Inquiry into
Kindleberger’s version of the theory may arouse curiosity about how he conceived it,
stated it, changed it, and treated other scholars’ variations of it over the course of his
career. It was a course that led from Berlin to M.I.T and back.
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